2025/780

22.4.2025

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2025/780

of 16 April 2025

imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of steel track shoes originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

1. PROCEDURE

1.1. Initiation

(1) On 23 August 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of steel track shoes originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’, ‘the PRC’ or ‘China’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the

Official Journal of the European Union

(2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 12 July 2024 by Duferco Travi e Profilati S.p.A. (‘the complainant’). The complaint was made by the Union industry of steel track shoes in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2. Registration

(3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2721 of 24 October 2024 (‘the registration Regulation’) (3).

1.3. Interested parties

(4) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’), known importers, suppliers and users, and traders known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(5) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

1.4. Sampling

(6) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

(7) In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. Only one Union producer came forward during the standing exercise and the Commission concluded that no sampling was necessary. The Union producer accounted for more than [52-58] % of the estimated total volume of production and approximately [6-11] % of the estimated total volume of sales of the like product in the Union. No comments were received from interested parties.

Sampling of unrelated importers

(8) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(9) No unrelated importers provided the requested information and therefore the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. No comments were received from interested parties.

Sampling of exporting producers

(10) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the GOC to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(11) Fifteen exporting producers in the country concerned provided the requested information. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of three exporting producers representing 62 % of the exports of the 15 Chinese exporting producers that provided the requested information.

1.5. Questionnaire replies and verification visits

(12) The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the GOC.

(13) Furthermore, the complainant provided in the complaint sufficient evidence of raw material distortions in China regarding the product concerned. Therefore, as announced in the Notice of Initiation, the investigation covered those raw material distortions to determine whether to apply the provisions of Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation with regard to China. For this reason, the Commission sent an additional questionnaire in this regard to the GOC.

(14) No reply was received from the GOC. Subsequently, on 11 October 2024, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC. No comments on the use of facts available were received.

(15) The Commission sent questionnaires to the Union producer, exporting producers, and the known importers and users. The same questionnaires were made available online (4) on the day of initiation.

(16) On 25 September 2024, the Commission informed the Chinese exporting producers of its sampling decision, granting the sampled exporting producers 30 days to submit their questionnaire replies. At this stage of the investigation, the sampled exporting producers did not notify the Commission that they would not submit a questionnaire reply.

(17) On 12 October 2024, two of the three sampled companies confirmed they would not submit a questionnaire reply due to the high workload involved.

(18) The deadline for the submission of the questionnaire reply expired on 25 October 2024. On 6 November 2024, the Commission asked the third sampled company to confirm whether it intended to submit a questionnaire reply. The third sampled exporting producer replied that it would also not submit a questionnaire reply either without providing a reason.

(19) Therefore, by 7 November 2024, almost two months and a half since the initiation of the investigation, it became clear that the three sampled Chinese exporting producers would not submit a questionnaire reply. While Article 17(4) of the basic Regulation allows for the selection of a new sample in case of sample failure, at such late stage of the investigation, it was no longer feasible for the Commission to change the full sample. Sampling other exporting producers would have significantly delayed the investigation.

(20) On 14 November 2024, the Commission issued a Note for the file (5) stating that, given that the sample of the exporting producers had failed, it intended to apply Article 18, in conjunction with Article 17(4), of the basic Regulation and to base its findings in respect of the Chinese exporting producers on best facts available. Neither of the non-sampled exporting producers came forward informing the Commission that they would like to be sampled.

(21) Considering that it was clear only at a late stage of the investigation that neither of the sampled exporting producers would cooperate and in view of the persisting material degree of non-cooperation of the exporting producers, the Commission decided to continue the investigation without selecting a new sample.

(22) The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following company:

Union producer

— Duferco Travi e Profilati S.p.A., Italy.

1.6. Investigation period and period considered

(23) The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

1.7. Individual examination

(24) One Chinese exporting producer, Komatsu Machinery Manufacturing (Shandong) (‘Komatsu’) requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. According to the questionnaire reply, Komatsu manufactured and exported track groups during the investigation period. However, in order to produce the track groups, it purchased the steel track shoes from an unrelated supplier in China and assembled these onto track chains. Therefore, since Komatsu did not manufacture the steel track shoes, the Commission considered that it was an exporter and not an exporting producer of the product concerned. Accordingly, the Commission provisionally concluded that the request for individual examination could not be granted.

2. PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1. Product under investigation

(25) The product under investigation is certain types of steel shoes, with or without rubber pads attached thereto, whether or not assembled in a track chain, with a maximum length of 3 000 mm, used on machines currently falling under headings 8426 , 8429 or 8430 , or conveyor belts currently falling under heading 8428 (‘the product under investigation’).

(26) The main use of steel track shoes (‘STS’) is as a component of tracked equipment used in construction and mining, such as excavators, bulldozers, cranes and conveyor belts. The product can be sold either standalone or as part of larger assembled components, such as ‘track groups’ (i.e. undercarriage parts formed by bolting together STS and track chains), ‘full track groups’ (i.e. track groups with additional components such as sprockets, rollers and idlers), and even complete undercarriages (supporting structures of earthmoving machines consisting each of two full track groups, their frames, and additional mechanical components).

(27) The main inputs for the production of STS are specialised steel products, called ‘steel profiles’. Steel profiles can be produced either by the same producers which produce the STS, or by other producers operating upstream. STS are produced by cutting steel profiles to length and possibly performing additional operations, such as heat treatment, drilling of holes, and painting.

(28) The assembly of STS into larger components, such as track groups, full track groups and undercarriages, can be performed either by the producers of the shoes themselves, or by other producers operating downstream (called ‘assemblers’).

2.2. Product concerned

(29) The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in the PRC, currently falling under CN codes currently classified under CN codes ex 8431 49 20 , ex 8431 39 00 , and ex 8431 49 80 (TARIC codes 8431 49 20 10, 8431 39 00 20 and 8431 49 80 10) (‘the product concerned’).

2.3. Like product

(30) The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

— the product concerned when exported to the Union;

— the product under investigation produced and sold on the domestic market of country concerned; and

— the product under investigation produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

(31) The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

2.4. Claims regarding product scope

(32) The complainant argued that STS sold as part of a track group or a full track group should fall within the product scope.

(33) The Commission confirmed that, along with STS sold as a standalone component, STS sold as part of track groups or full track groups fall within the product scope. However, STS sold as part of components larger than a full track group, such as undercarriages or complete tracked machines, fall outside the product scope because STS represent only a relatively small fraction of the overall value of these larger components.

(34) One importer of floor plates from steel casting requested that this specific type of STS is excluded from the product scope on the grounds of significant differences in physical and technical characteristics as well as different end-uses when compared to the products produced by the Union industry. The importer claimed that these floor plates from steel casting are tailor-made and can only be used in crawler cranes and mining excavators produced by it.

(35) The importer came forward only several months after the deadlines specified in the Notice of Initiation. A more detailed assessment of the information provided was therefore not feasible at provisional stage due to time constraints set by the timeframe in Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation. The Commission notes that the products are currently imported under CN code 8431 49 20 falling within the product scope and that they are also falling within the product description of the Notice of initiation. The submission did therefore not affect the provisional conclusions concerning the product scope. However, the Commission will further investigate this issue and provide a final assessment at definitive stage of this investigation.

3. DUMPING

3.1. Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation

(36) In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation with regard to the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(37) Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing STS. Eight exporting producers submitted the relevant information.

(38) In order to obtain the information that it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the

Official Journal of the European Union

. No submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. As mentioned in recital (13), no reply to the questionnaire was received from the GOC.

(39) In point 3 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it had provisionally selected Türkiye as an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate representative countries in accordance with the criteria set out in 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(40) On 14 November 2024, the Commission informed by a Note for the file (6) all interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In the Note, the Commission stated that in view of the fact that none of the sampled exporting producers submitted a reply to the questionnaire and thus failed to cooperate in the investigation, the information provided by the complainant and other sources of available information deemed appropriate according to the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, including the database of the World Bank, Orbis Bureau van Dijk (‘Orbis’), Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) and International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’) statistics, were used to prepare the list of factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of STS. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Türkiye and Indonesia as possible appropriate representative countries. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A costs’) and profits based on the information publicly available of producers of STS in the representative country. The Commission received no comments on the Note.

3.2. Normal value

(41) According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘

the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country

’.

(42) However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘

in case it is determined … that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks

’, and ‘

shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits

’.

(43) As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

3.2.1. Existence of significant distortions

(44) In recent investigations concerning the steel sector in the PRC (7), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present.

(45) In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (8). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the steel sector, which is the sector of the main raw material to produce the product under investigation, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (9), but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (10). The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (11). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (12). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the steel sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (13), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (14).

(46) Like in previous investigations concerning the steel sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the complaint, as well as in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations (15) (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under investigation. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC, as also found in its previous investigations in this respect.

(47) The complaint, referring to the Report, alleged that market conditions, in particular costs and prices, in Chinese steel industry are not driven by market forces of supply and demand, but instead are distorted by State intervention in the economy.

(48) In this regard, the complaint provided examples of elements pointing to the existence of distortions, as listed in the first to sixth indent of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. In addition to references to the relevant parts of the Report, the complaint pointed out in particular that:

— State presence in firms allows the State to interfere with respect to prices and costs

. The Chinese economic system is based on the concept of a socialist market economy, the core principle of which is the socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The socialist market economy is developed under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) and the structures of the State and those of the CCP are intertwined at every level. The Chinese State also engages in an interventionist economic policy in pursuance of goals that coincide with the political agenda set by the CCP rather than reflecting the prevailing economic conditions in a free market. Specifically in the steel sector, which is the source of the main raw material used to produce the product under investigation, a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists and the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence.

— The steel market, including the product under investigation, is served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the GOC

. The complaint indicated that specifically in the steel sector, State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) play a central role. Major SOEs active in the steel sector include the China Baowu Group, Ansteel Group and Shougang Group, which are among the top 10 of the world’s largest steel producers. The complaint argued that given the high level of government intervention in the steel sector in general, including in the track shoes industry, even privately owned producers are prevented from operating under normal market circumstances. Both public and privately owned enterprises in the track shoes industry are subject to policy supervision by the State.

— Public policies or measures discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influence free market forces

. Overall, in the PRC the system of planning results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or politically important to the GOC, rather than being allocated by market forces. The agriculture machinery equipment industry is regarded as an important industry supported by the GOC. This is confirmed by the ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative, which introduces a road map for the Chinese manufacturing sector. Track shoes are a key component of high-end agricultural machinery such as large machines, duplex operation machines and tools. As such, the production of the product under investigation is considered as a strategic industry for the Chinese economy and is subject to significant incentives and subsidies. The complaint also reiterated that the steel industry benefits from the GOC’s consistent intervention, starting at the sector’s roots (i.e. the steelmaking raw materials market), resulting in a sector permeated by unfair and artificial advantages originating from the distorted mechanisms of price formation.

— There is a lack and discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws

, thereby generating distortions when keeping insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC. The complaint referred in this regard to the Commission’s conclusions in previous investigations (16) and argued that these conclusions would equally apply to the Chinese producers of track shoes.

— Wage costs are distorted

. The complaint referred to the Commission’s conclusions in previous investigations (17) and argued that these conclusions would equally apply to the Chinese producers of track shoes.

— Access to finance for corporate actors is affected by significant distortions resulting from the continuing pervasive role of the State in the capital markets

. The complaint argued that the GOC has awarded or granted asset-related or project-related government subsidies to be sent on industrial revitalisation, technological development and construction projects relating to the steel sector.

(49) In conclusion, the complainant considered that, due to these distortions from substantial government intervention, the costs and prices in China are not reliable for the purpose of determining the normal value. As such, the normal value should be established by using non-distorted production costs in an appropriate representative country.

(50) The Commission’s investigation confirmed that in the sector of the product under investigation, which is part of the downstream steel sector, a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation. Both public and privately owned enterprises in the sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance. Producers include private companies such as Shandong Juning Machinery Co. Ltd. (18) or Liaoan Machinery Co. Ltd. (19), as well as companies with partial State ownership such as XCMG Undercarriage Co., Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the XCMG Construction Machinery Group Co. Ltd (‘XCMG’) in which State ownership amounts to 28,24 % (20).

(51) While the Commission did not identify more specific information on State ownership in the track shoes sector, this sector is a sub-sector of the steel sector and the findings concerning State ownership in the steel sector are therefore relevant for track shoes. Examples of SOEs active in the steel sector include: the Ansteel Group (21) and the Baowu Steel Group (22), which are both SOEs under the central State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (‘SASAC’); the Baotou Steel Group, an SOE owned by the Inner Mongolian Government (23); as well as the Shougang Group (24), an SOE wholly owned by the Beijing State-Owned Asset Management Ltd (25).

(52) Furthermore, the latest Chinese policy documents concerning the steel sector confirm the continued importance which the GOC attributes to the sector, including the intention to intervene in the sector to shape it in line with government policies. This is exemplified by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (‘MIIT’) Guiding Opinion on Fostering a High-Quality Development of the Steel Industry (‘Guiding Opinion’), which calls for further consolidation of the industrial foundation and significant improvement in the modernization level of the industrial chain (26), including the supply of special steel, an input used to produce the product under investigation.

(53) Specifically, this Guiding Opinion requires to ‘

[p]romote mergers and reorganizations of enterprises. Encourage leading enterprises in the industry to implement mergers and reorganizations and create a number of world-class super-large steel enterprise groups. Relying on the industry's dominant enterprises, cultivate 1 to 2 specialized leading enterprises in the fields of stainless steel, special steel, (…).

’ Further, it explicitly requires to ‘

[S]upport steel companies to target the upgrading of downstream industries and the development direction of strategic emerging industries, focus on the development of small batches and multiple varieties of key steels such as high-quality special steels, special alloy steels for high-end equipment, and steel for core basic parts

’ (27).

(54) Another example of the GOC’s intention to intervene in the steel sector can be found in the 14

Five-Year Plan on Developing the Raw Material Industry (‘14

FYP’) according to which the sector will ‘

adhere to the combination of market leadership and government promotion

’ and will ‘

cultivate a group of leading companies with ecological leadership and core competitiveness

’ (28).

(55) Additionally, the MIIT 2023 Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry (29) sets the following objectives: ‘

In 2023, […] the investment in fixed assets in the entire industry shall maintain a steady growth, and the economic benefits shall be significantly improved; the industry’s R&D investment shall eventually reach 1,5 %; the industry’s added value growth shall reach about 3,5 %; in 2024, the industry development environment and industry structure shall be further optimized, the move towards high-end, intelligent, and green products shall continue, and the industry added value growth shall exceed 4 %

’, and foresees government mandated corporate consolidation of the steel sector: ‘

[e]ncourage industry-leading enterprises to implement mergers and acquisitions, build world-class super-large iron and steel enterprise groups, and foster the optimal layout of national iron and steel production capacity. Support specialized enterprises with leading power in particular steel market segments to further integrate resources and create a steel industry ecosystem. Encourage iron and steel enterprises to carry out cross-regional […] mergers and reorganizations […]. Consider giving greater policy support for capacity replacement to iron and steel enterprises that have completed substantive mergers and reorganizations

.’

(56) Furthermore, the GOC intends to intervene in the engineering machinery sector, as set out in the MIIT Notice on a Work Plan for the sustained growth of the machinery industry 2023-2024, which requires to ‘

Promote the development of industrial clusters, cultivate and build a number of characteristic industrial clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises in machinery and equipment manufacturing,

[…and]

promote the innovative development of 10 advanced manufacturing clusters with a scale of 100 billion yuan, such as rail transportation, construction machinery, and intelligent equipment, and build industrial clusters with international competitiveness

’ (30).

(57) Similar examples of the GOC’s intention to supervise and guide the developments of the steel sector can be seen at the provincial level, such as in Hebei where the provincial government released the Three-Year Action Plan on Cluster Development in the Steel Industry Chain in 2020. This plan requires to ‘

steadily implement the group development of organizations, accelerate the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, focus on promoting the cross-regional merger and reorganization of private iron and steel enterprises, and strive to establish 1-2 world-class large groups, 3-5 large groups with domestic influence

.’ (31) Moreover, Hebei’s plan in the steel sector states: ‘

Adhere to structural adjustment and highlight product diversification. Unswervingly promote the structural adjustment and layout optimization of the iron and steel industry, promote the consolidation, reorganization, transformation and upgrading of enterprises, and comprehensively promote the development of the iron and steel industry in the direction of large-scale enterprises, modernization of technical equipment, diversification of production processes, and diversification of downstream products

’ (32).

(58) More specifically as regards the inputs used to produce the product under investigation, Hebei’s Plan requires to ‘

[a]ccelerate the development and application of high-end and key new steel materials, increase the proportion of high-quality and special steel varieties, strengthen the quality stability of large-scale and wide-ranging advantageous products, and create a “pyramid” product structure. By the end of 2020, the proportion of ordinary low-alloy steel and alloy steel will be increased to 20 %, and by the end of 2022, it will reach about 25 %, providing support and guarantee for the upgrading of downstream industries

’ (33).

(59) Likewise, the Henan Implementation Plan for the Transformation and Upgrade of the Steel Industry during the 14

FYP requires to ‘

focus on national strategic needs, guide enterprises to promote the optimization and upgrading of product structure, develop high-quality special steel, high-performance marine engineering steel, special alloy steel for high-end equipment, core basic parts steel and other “special, fine, high” key varieties, and enhance the added value and competitiveness of steel products

’ (34).

(60) Similar industrial policy objectives can also be found in the planning documents of other provinces, such as Jiangsu (35), Shandong (36), Shanxi (37) or Zhejiang (38).

(61) In this regard, another example of effective steering by the GOC through the plans is the Notice of the Ansteel Group Co., Ltd.’s Party Committee on conscientiously studying, publicizing and implementing the spirit of the Party’s 20

National Congress (39). The notice claims that the Ansteel Group will conscientiously implement the guiding plans and better introduce them to Party members, cadres and employees of the entire group.

(62) As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, the investigation confirmed that overlaps between managerial positions and CCP membership/Party functions exist also in the steel track shoe sector.

(63) By way of example, the Chairman of XCMG simultaneously serves as the Party Secretary. Moreover, the General Manager of XCMG is not only the Deputy Secretary of XCMG’s Party Committee, but he also previously served as member of the Party Leadership Group of the Xuzhou Municipal Government Office, as well as Deputy Secretary-General of the Xuzhou Municipal CCP Committee (40).

(64) XCMG has underlined on several occasions its unconditional loyalty to the CCP and its willingness to accept the Party’s leading role. According to XCMG’s own statements: ‘[

t]he “Red XCMG” Party Building Ecological System takes the glorious historical tradition of XCMG Group as the “red gene”, the organizational strength construction of grassroots party organizations as the “red cell”, and the role of high-quality party building work as the “red engine”

’. Moreover, ‘[

i]n the 80 years since its establishment, XCMG has always integrated the leadership of the party into all levels of the company's operations, making the party the most reliable core force when storms come, ensuring the correct direction of the company's business development

’.

(65) The Commission’s investigation confirmed that XCMG intends to continue its allegiance to the CCP in the future since the company ‘

will be guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, fully implement the spirit of the 20th CPC National Congress and the two important speeches of General Secretary Xi Jinping, resolutely shoulder the important mission of state-owned enterprises as the “pillars” of the socialist economy with Chinese characteristics, […] lead the company’s high-quality development with the strong leadership of the Party, and make new and greater contributions to the realization of the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation!

’ (41)

Incidentally, this statement also suggests that XCMG, irrespective of formal shareholding distribution, considers itself an SOE.

(66) Additionally, given that the product under investigation represents a sub-sector of the steel sector, the information available with respect to steel producers is relevant also to the product under investigation.

(67) For instance, the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager of Baoshan Iron and Steel Ltd., a steel producer whose controlling shareholder is the Baowu Steel Group, also serve as the company’s Party Committee Secretary and Deputy Secretary respectively (42). Likewise, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Wuhan Iron and Steel Group, also controlled by the Baowu Steel Group, serves as the Party Committee Secretary (43). Moreover, ‘

Wuhan Iron and Steel Group held the tenth centralized study and discussion of the Party Committee Theory Study Group in 2022 to convey and study the spirit of the Central Economic Work Conference and promote the implementation of the decisions and arrangements of the 20th National Congress of the Party and the spirit of the Central Economic Work Conference in Wuhan Iron and Steel Group.

[The]

General Representative of China Baowu Wuhan Headquarters, Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of Wuhan Iron and Steel Group, presided over the meeting and put forward requirements for implementing the requirements of the Party Central Committee, the Hubei Provincial Party Committee and the China Baowu Party Committee, and further implementing the spirit of the Central Economic Work Conference

’ (44).

(68) Furthermore, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Baotou Steel Union, belonging to the Baotou Steel Group, serves also as the company’s Party Secretary. Similarly, the Executive Manager of Baotou Steel Union as well as the Chairman of the company’s trade union are both Deputy Party Secretaries (45). Finally, within the Shougang Group, the Chairman of the Board of Directors serves as the Party Committee Secretary, while the Executive Manager is the Deputy Secretary of the company’s Party Committee (46).

(69) Government control and policy supervision can be also observed at the level of the relevant industry associations (47), in particular the China Construction Machinery Association (‘CCMA’) (48), which has set up a Construction Machinery Parts Branch (49).

(70) The CCMA states in Article 3 of its Articles of Association that the organisation ‘

adheres to the overall leadership of the Communist Party of China and, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, establishes organizations of the Communist Party of China to carry out party activities and

provide

necessary conditions for the activities of party organizations. The entity in charge of registration and management of this association is the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, and the entity in charge of Party building is the Party Committee of SASAC

’ and that it ‘

accepts business guidance and supervision from entities in charge of registration and management, entities in charge of Party building, and industry management departments

’ (50). Article 36 of the CCMA Articles of Association provides that the persons in charge of the association needs to ‘[a]

dhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and have good political qualities

’ (51).

(71) XCMG is a member of CCMA and occupies a vice-presidency of the Association (52).

(72) Further, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation are in place in the Chinese steel sector, and these are generally applicable to the product under investigation given that the STS sector is a sub-sector of the steel sector.

(73) The steel industry is consistently considered as a key industry by the GOC (53). This is confirmed in the numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on the sector, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level. Under the 14

FYP, the GOC earmarked the steel industry for transformation and upgrade, as well as optimization and structural adjustment (54). Similarly, the 14

FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry, applicable also to the steel industry, lists the sector as the ‘

bedrock of the real economy

’ and ‘

a key field that shapes China’s international competitive edge

’ and sets a number of objectives and working methods which would drive the development of the sector in the time period 2021-2025, such as technological upgrade, improving the structure of the sector (not least by means of further corporate concentrations) or digital transformation (55).

(74) Moreover, the abovementioned MIIT Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry (see recital (49)) demonstrates how the focus of the Chinese authorities on the sector is put into the wider context of the GOC steering the Chinese economy: ‘[s]

upport steel companies to closely follow the needs of new infrastructure, new urbanization, rural revitalization, and emerging industries, dock with major engineering projects related to the “14th Five-Year Plan” in various regions, and make every effort to ensure steel supply. Establish and deepen upstream and downstream cooperation mechanisms between steel and key steel-using sectors such as shipbuilding, transportation, construction, energy, automobiles, home appliances, agricultural machinery, and heavy equipment, carry out production-demand docking activities, and actively expand steel application fields

’ (56).

(75) At local level, such as in the Shandong province, where Shandong Juning Machinery Co. Ltd is located, the Shandong 14

FYP for iron and steel industry development (57) requires the following: ‘

Steel for construction machinery: Support our province to move from a major construction machinery province to a strong construction machinery province, focus on developing green and environmentally friendly, high purity, excellent low-temperature impact performance, stable hardenability and easy-to-cut construction machinery steel, accelerate the research and development of high-strength construction machinery steel

[…],

meet the development needs of modern construction machinery with high power and low dead weight, and realize the iterative upgrade of the downstream customer industry chain and the complete and healthy development of the construction machinery manufacturing industry ecosystem

’.

(76) Moreover, in the Liaoning province, where Liaoan Machinery Co. Ltd is located, measures are in place to ensure preferential treatment to certain companies qualifying as ‘little giants (58)’. The purpose of such preferential treatment is to ‘

to encourage these firms to tackle technological challenges, develop new products, build up the supporting capacities of the industrial chain

’ (59). Liaoan Machinery Co. Ltd was listed as a ‘little giant’ by the Liaoning province in 2021 (60).

(77) In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of the main raw materials used to manufacture the product under investigation. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

(78) The present investigation has not revealed any evidence that the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the steel sector, according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation would not affect the manufacturers of the product under investigation.

(79) The product under investigation is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recital (45). Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under investigation or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) (61).

(80) Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the sector of the product under investigation is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recital (45). The abovementioned (see recital(55)) Work Plan on the Stable Growth exemplifies also this type of government intervention very well: ‘

Encourage financial institutions to actively provide financial services to steel companies that implement mergers and reorganizations, layout adjustments, transformation and upgrading, in accordance with the principles of risk control and business sustainability

.’ Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

(81) Finally, the Commission recalls that in order to produce the product under investigation, a number of inputs is needed. When the producers of the product under investigation purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors.

(82) As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product under investigation are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

(83) In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under investigation, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case.

(84) The GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the complainant, on the existence of significant distortions and/or appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand.

(85) The Commission did not receive any comments from interested parties in relation to the existence of significant distortions in the PRC.

(86) In view of the above, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as described in the following section.

3.2.2. Representative country

3.2.2.1. General remarks

(87) The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

— A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank (62);

— Production of the product under investigation in that country;

— Availability of relevant public data in the representative country;

— Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference was given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.

(88) As explained in recital (40), on 14 November 2024 the Commission issued a note for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value and on the factors of production (63). This Note described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria and informed interested parties of its intention to consider Türkiye or Indonesia as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

A level of economic development similar to the PRC

(89) In the Note, the Commission identified Türkiye and Indonesia as countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank, (i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis). According to the complaint, in both countries production of the product under investigation was known to take place.

(90) No comments were received with respect to the level of economic development of the identified countries.

Availability of relevant readily available data in the representative country

(91) Regarding Türkiye, the Commission stated in the Note that the complainant identified two producers of STS, namely Ozkan Demir Celik Sanayi Anonim Sirketi and Bs Track Makina Yedek Parca Imalat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi. The financial statements of Ozkan Demir Celik Sanayi Anonim Sirketi, which showed a reasonable level of profitability for a period most recent to the investigation period (2022), were available in Orbis. The financial statements of BS Track Makina Yedek Parca Imalat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi were not available as this company was only established in 2023. Additionally, the complaint identified a producer of different products in the same general category and/or sector as the product under investigation, namely Kocaer Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS. The financial statements for a period partially overlapping with the investigation period (2023) were available in Orbis and show a reasonable level of profitability for that period.

(92) With regard to Indonesia, the Commission could not identify any producers of STS.

(93) The Commission also analysed the imports of the main factors of production into the potential representative countries. The analysis of import data showed that the imports into Indonesia of the major factor of production (i.e. the special steel profiles imported under HS code 722870) was almost exclusively imported from China during the investigation period (96,8 % at the HS code level). Therefore, the Commission found that Indonesia could not be considered as an appropriate representative country.

(94) The same analysis also showed that imports of the main factors of production into Türkiye were not materially affected by imports from the PRC or any of the countries listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council (64).

(95) In the Note, the Commission also analysed export and/or imports restrictions of the main factors of production based on the Global Trade Alert (65) database and the Market Access Map (66).

(96) For Türkiye, no export and/or import restrictions on the product under investigation, nor on the raw materials, were identified.

(97) For Indonesia, the Commission identified that it imposed safeguard measures concerning imports of the special steel profiles (HS code 722870) from China in 2022 until the end of 2024.

(98) No comments were received concerning the appropriateness of each of the above possible representative countries.

(99) In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally concluded that Türkiye was an appropriate representative country and that the data of Kocaer Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS will be used in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first ident of the basic Regulation.

Level of social and environmental protection

(100) Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

3.2.2.2. Conclusion

(101) In view of the above analysis, Türkiye met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

3.2.3. Sources used to establish undistorted costs

(102) In the Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as raw materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the complainant, as explained in recital (40), and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note. No comments were received.

3.2.3.1. Factors of production

(103) Considering the information submitted by the complainant, as explained in recital (40), the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of product under investigation

Factor of Production	Commodity Code	Source	Unit of measurement	Undistorted value (CNY)
Raw materials
Special steel profiles	72287010, 722870900011, 722870900019	Global Trade Atlas (GTA) – Türkiye	kg	7,39
Paint	n/a	Complaint	to paint 1 tonne of product under investigation	163,89
Labour
Labour	n/a	National statistics	hours	96,76
Energy
Electricity	n/a	National statistics	kWh	0,77
Natural Gas	n/a	National statistics	M3	4,06

(104) The Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, the Commission expressed the manufacturing overhead cost incurred by the complainant for the production of the product under investigation as a percentage of the actual cost of the used raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials in order to obtain the undistorted manufacturing overhead cost. The Commission considered that, in the absence of any cooperation from the exporting producers and based on Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the ratio between the complainant’s raw material and the reported overhead costs could reasonably be used as an indication to estimate the undistorted manufacturing overhead costs.

3.2.4. Raw materials

(105) In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties were added. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (67). The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in recital (86) that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices.

(106) In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials, as provided by Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission added the relevant import duties to the CIF value recorded in the import statistics of the representative country, as available in GTA.

(107) Due to a lack of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, an alternative method was used to estimate the cost of paint for STS. Based on the information submitted by the complainant, the cost of the paint was found to be approximately 1,97 % of the cost of the special steel profiles needed to produce the product under investigation during the investigation period. In the absence of any other available information, the Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, this percentage could reasonably be used as an indication to estimate the undistorted cost of the paint.

Labour

(108) The Turkish Statistical Institute (68) publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Türkiye. The Commission used the latest available statistics covering 2022 for average labour cost for the economic activity C.24 (Manufacture of basic metals) according to NACE Rev.2 classification. The 2022 average monthly value was duly adjusted for inflation using the labour cost index as published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (69) to adapt to the investigation period, i.e. 96,76 CNY/hour, using the exchange rate for the investigation period attached to the questionnaire for exporting producers.

Electricity

(109) The Commission used the electricity price statistics published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) (70) in its regular press releases. The Commission used the data of the industrial electricity prices in Kuruş/kWh (71) for the industrial sector for 2023, which partly covers the investigation period, i.e. 0,77 CNY/kWh, using the exchange rate for the investigation period attached to the questionnaire for exporting producers.

Natural gas

(110) The Commission used the price of gas for industrial users in Türkiye as published by the Turkish Statistical Institute in its regular press releases. The Commission used the data of the gas prices in the corresponding consumption band in Kuruş/m

, duly adjusted for inflation during the investigation period using the Producer Price Index published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (72), i.e. 4,06 CNY/m

, using the exchange rate for the investigation period attached to the questionnaire for exporting producers. The price is adjusted for VAT of 18 %, as the quoted price is VAT included.

Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A costs, profits and depreciation

(111) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘

the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits

’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(112) In order to establish an undistorted value of the manufacturing overheads and given the absence of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. Therefore, based on the data of the complainant, the Commission established the ratio of manufacturing overheads to the total manufacturing and labour costs. This percentage was then applied to the undistorted value of the cost of manufacturing to obtain the undistorted value of manufacturing overheads.

(113) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A costs, profit and depreciation, the Commission relied on the financial data for 2023 for Kocaer Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS, as extracted from Orbis.

Calculation

(114) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(115) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the complainant on the usage of each factor (materials and labour) for the production of the product under investigation during the investigation period. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in Section 3.2.4.

(116) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, SG&A costs, profit and depreciation as noted in recitals (112) to (107). They were determined on the basis of the financial statements of Kocaer Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS, as explained in recital (113).

(117) Then the Commission added manufacturing overheads and depreciation, as explained in recital (112), to the undistorted cost of manufacturing in order to arrive at the undistorted costs of production.

(118) To the costs of production established as described in the previous recital, the Commission applied SG&A costs and profit of Kocaer Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS. The SG&A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production amounted to 5,21 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production amounted to 11,4 %.

(119) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

3.3. Export price

(120) Given the non-cooperation by the Chinese exporting producers, the export price was established on the basis of the FOB prices indicated in a set of offers and invoices for the supply of 10 types of STS by five Chinese exporting producers to Union users during the investigation period, included in the complaint.

3.4. Comparison

(121) Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand, the Commission compared the normal value and the export price thus established at the

ex-works

level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the

ex-works

level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

3.4.1. Adjustments made to the normal value

(122) As explained in recitals (114) to (119), the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG&A costs and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level.

(123) The Commission found no reasons for making any allowances to the normal value and, given the non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers, no allowances were claimed by any of the sampled exporting producers.

3.4.2. Adjustments made to the export price

(124) In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of the domestic transport cost, based on public sources (73) and any other information available, due to the non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers.

3.5. Dumping margin

(125) For all exporting producers in the PRC, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

(126) The CIF price was constructed from the FOB export price, adjusted by adding ocean freight based on the global ocean freight container pricing index FBX11 (74).

(127) The provisional dumping margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, is as follows:

Company	Provisional dumping margin
All imports originating in country concerned	62,5 %

4. INJURY

4.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production

(128) The like product was manufactured by three producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. The Union industry does not include assemblers, which are producers that do not themselves produce the STS but purchase them from a third party and assemble them onto larger components, such as track groups.

(129) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 59 700 tonnes. The Commission established the figure based on the reply to the macro questionnaire, which was submitted by the complainant. As indicated in recital (7), no sampling was necessary and the cooperating Union producer represented more than [52-58] % of the estimated total Union production of the like product.

4.2. Union consumption

(130) In the absence of import statistics pertaining specifically to the product under investigation, and given the lack of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, as explained in recital (16), the Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the methodology provided in the complaint. According to this methodology, the Union consumption is comprised of the consumption for new tracked machines and the consumption for the aftermarket. For the consumption of STS for new tracked machines, the Commission used an estimate of the volume of tracked machines sold in the Union, an estimate of the average number of track shoes and the average unit weight per track shoe for each tracked machine. For the consumption of STS for the aftermarket, the Commission used an estimate of the installed based of tracked machines in the Union and an average number of years for replacement of STS (75).

(131) The Commission considered this methodology appropriate, given that no other statistical data was available.

(132) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (tonnes)

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Total Union consumption

125 877

129 822

128 671

130 007

Index

100

103

102

103

Source:

Complaint methodology.

(133) The total Union consumption remained relatively stable between 2021 and the end of the IP, showing only a slight increase of 3 %. This trend can be linked to the relatively stable situation of the construction sector in the Union for which the tracked machines are used.

4.3. Imports from the country concerned

4.3.1. Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned

(134) The Commission established the volume of imports and market shares on the basis of the Union consumption calculated as described in recital (130). The volume of total imports from all third countries was established by deducting the Union sales of Union producers from the total Union consumption. The resulting volume of total imports was then allocated to the PRC and to other third countries based on the share of imports of each country reported by Eurostat for CN code 8431 49 20 , considering that, according to the complainant, the description of this CN code (76) corresponds most closely to the product imported and sold in the Union market.

(135) Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import quantity (tonnes) and market share

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Quantity of imports from the PRC (tonnes)

62 273

68 126

74 981

76 681

Index

100

109

120

123

Market share

49 %

52 %

58 %

59 %

Source:

Complaint methodology.

(136) Imports from the PRC increased by 9 % between 2021 and 2022 from 62 273 tonnes to 68 126 tonnes. In 2023, imports further climbed to 74 981 tonnes, followed by a moderate increase until the end of the IP to 76 681 tonnes. This overall increase of 23 % over the period considered exceeded by far the development of Union consumption, which increased only by 3 %, as described in recital (133).

(137) As a result, the market share of imports from the PRC increased from 49,0 % to 59 % over the period considered.

4.4. Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

(138) For the investigation period, in the absence of cooperation from the Chinese exporting producers, the Commission established the prices of imports from the country concerned on the basis of the FOB prices indicated in a set of offers and invoices for the supply of STS by Chinese exporting producers to Union users, as provided by the complainant. The weighted average of these prices was adjusted for transport costs, as reported by the global ocean freight container pricing index FBX11 (77), to arrive at an average CIF price at the Union border.

(139) The above import price was then used to establish the import price for the years of 2021 to 2023, assuming that the trend of the import price of the product under investigation over the entire period considered followed the trend of the average price of imports from the PRC under the CN code 8431 49 20 , as reported by Eurostat. For example, if the average price of all imports from the PRC reported under CN code 8431 49 20 was 5 % higher in 2023 compared to the IP, then the price of imports of the product concerned in 2023 was calculated by multiplying the price of the product concerned established for the IP by 1,05.

(140) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as shown in Table 4. In view of the fact that dumping, undercutting and injury margin calculations are based only on average import prices and average Union sales prices, and in order to ensure confidentiality of the latter, import prices are shown in ranges.

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

PRC

[757 -1 280 ]

[925 -1 564 ]

[760 -1 286 ]

[725 -1 226 ]

Index

100

122

100

Source:

Offers for the supply of STS by Chinese exporting producers to Union users, FBX11, Eurostat.

(141) Prices of imports from the PRC increased between 2021 and 2022 from [757-1 280] EUR/tonne to [925-1 564] EUR/tonne. In 2023, the average import price dropped to [760-1 286] EUR/tonne, followed by a decrease to [725-1 226] EUR/tonne. Import prices were consistently below the price of the Union industry during the whole period considered (see Table 8).

(142) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

(1) the weighted average sales prices of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

(2) the weighted average import prices as established in recital (138).

(143) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the cooperating Union producer’s theoretical turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 28,8 % by the imports from the country concerned on the Union market.

4.5. Economic situation of the Union industry

4.5.1. General remarks

(144) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(145) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply submitted by the complainant covering data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply of the complainant. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(146) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(147) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

4.5.2. Macroeconomic indicators

4.5.2.1. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(148) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Production quantity (tonnes)

101 039

81 721

60 730

59 725

Index

100

Production capacity (tonnes)

133 000

Index

100

Capacity utilisation (%)

Index

100

Source:

Reply to the macro questionnaire.

(149) Throughout the period considered, the production volume of the Union industry decreased from about 101 000 tonnes in 2021 to about 59 700 tonnes in the investigation period, which represented a decrease of 41 %.

(150) During the period considered, the production capacity of the Union industry remained stable at 133 000 tonnes.

(151) As such, capacity utilisation dropped over the period considered from 76 % in 2021 to 45 % during the investigation period. This trend is in line with the decrease of the production quantity, resulting in a relative decrease of 41 %.

4.5.2.2. Sales quantity and market share

(152) The Union industry’s sales quantity and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales quantity and market share

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Total sales quantity on the Union market (tonnes)

38 907

32 118

23 257

23 148

Index

100

Market share %

Index

100

Source:

Reply to the macro questionnaire.

(153) Throughout the period considered, the total Union sales dropped from about 38 900 tonnes in 2021 to 23 148 tonnes in the investigation period, i.e. by 41 %.

(154) At the same time, the Union industry’s market share decreased from 31 % in 2021 to only 18 % over the period considered, with the main decrease between 2022 and 2023.

4.5.2.3. Growth

(155) Considering the decrease in market share of Union sales volumes, the Union industry was not able to benefit from the stable and slightly growing consumption on the Union market over the period considered.

4.5.2.4. Employment and productivity

(156) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Number of employees

243

205

193

190

Index

100

Productivity (tonnes/employee)

416

399

315

314

Index

100

Source:

Reply to the macro questionnaire.

(157) The Union industry employment decreased by 22 % from 2021 to the investigation period on a FTE basis. This trend largely followed the trend in production volume, as shown in Table 5.

(158) The productivity in terms of tonnes reflected the developments on production and employment and decreased in line with the trend on employment.

4.5.2.5. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

(159) The dumping margin was significantly above the

de minimis

level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margin of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(160) This is the first anti-dumping investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past dumping.

4.5.3. Microeconomic indicators

4.5.3.1. Prices and factors affecting prices

(161) The weighted average unit sales prices of the cooperating Union producer to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as shown in Table 7. To ensure confidentiality, the figures are provided in ranges:

Table 8

Sales prices in the Union

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/ ton)

[838 -1 357 ]

[1 125 -1 823 ]

[1 073 -1 738 ]

[1 029 -1 667 ]

Index

100

134

128

123

Unit cost of production (EUR/ton)

[841 –1 422 ]

[1 104 –1 866 ]

[1 199 -1 891 ]

[1 094 –1 849 ]

Index

100

131

133

130

Source:

Cooperating Union producer questionnaire.

(162) Sales prices on the Union market increased between 2021 and 2022 by 34 %. In the period between 2022 and the investigation period, prices decreased by 8 %. The increase in sales prices between 2021 and 2022 can be linked to the increase in costs, as further described below. However, due to the low-priced dumped Chinese imports, the price level decreased between 2022 and the investigation period.

(163) The average unit cost of production increased between 2021 and 2022 by 31 %. Between 2022 and the investigation period, the average unit cost of production remained stable.

4.5.3.2. Labour costs

(164) The average labour costs of the cooperating Union producer developed over the period considered as shown in Table 9. To ensure confidentiality, figures are given in ranges:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Average labour costs per employee (EUR)

[32 516 -54 956 ]

[34 463 - 58 247 ]

[31 914 -53 939 ]

[33 220 -56 147 ]

Index

100

106

102

Source:

Cooperating Union producer questionnaire.

(165) The average labour costs per employee slightly increased between 2021 and 2022 by 6 % on an FTE basis. Between 2022 and 2023, labour cost dropped by 8 %, while between 2023 and the investigation period there was a slight increase of 4 %. Therefore, over the period considered the average labour costs remained relatively stable.

4.5.3.3. Inventories

(166) Stock levels of the cooperating Union producer developed over the period considered as shown in Table 10. To ensure confidentiality, figures are given in ranges:

Table 10

Stocks

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Closing stock (unit of measurement)

[1 844 -3 116 ]

[1 976 - 3 340 ]

[1 792 -3 029 ]

[1 367 - 2 310 ]

Index

100

107

Closing stock as a percentage of production

[4 -6 ]

[4 -7 ]

[5 -9 ]

[4 -7 ]

Index

100

117

152

119

Source:

Cooperating Union producer questionnaire.

(167) The stocks of the cooperating Union producer slightly increased between 2021 and 2022 by 7 %. Overall, the level of stocks decreased by 26 % over the period considered. Given that the majority of production takes place based on orders and customer specifications, inventories do not constitute a meaningful indicator of injury.

4.5.3.4. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(168) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the cooperating Union producer developed over the period considered as shown in Table 11. To ensure confidentiality, figures are given in ranges:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)

[3 -5 ]

[4 -7 ]

[(–2 ) – (–3 )]

[(–7 ) – (–11 )]

Index

100

127

–57

– 209

Cash flow (EUR)

[477 856 -807 643 ]

[2 283 650 -3 859 690 ]

[9 438 002 -15 951 553 ]

[1 551 657 -2 622 520 ]

Index

100

478

1 975

325

Investments (EUR)

[1 133 379 -1 915 570 ]

[1 039 444 -1 756 807 ]

[1 596 285 -2 697 947 ]

[1 167 093 -1 972 552 ]

Index

100

141

103

Return on investments

[10 -16 ]

[24 -40 ]

[(–4 ) – (–6 )]

[(–5 ) – (–8 )]

Index

100

247

–39

–51

Source:

Cooperating Union producer questionnaire.

(169) The Commission established the profitability of the cooperating Union producer by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(170) The profitability increased by less than 2 percentage points between 2021 and 2022, following the increase in sales prices that allowed the Union industry to cover for its increased cost of production. However, due to the price pressure exerted by the Chinese dumped imports, as of 2023, the Union industry was forced to reduce its prices at levels below the cost of production. This had an impact of the profitability, which dropped dramatically (between four and nine percentage points) between 2022 and the investigation period.

(171) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. Between 2021 and 2022, the trend in net cash flow increased, which was in line with the development on profitability. In 2023, there was an exceptional increase due to the reduction of receivables, while in the IP the net cash flow decreased considerably.

(172) Investments dropped by 8 % between 2021 and 2022. Although investments increased by 49 % between 2022 and 2023, followed by a decrease of 38 % between 2023 and the investigation period, they remained overall at low levels since the beginning of the period considered and were mainly made to achieve efficiency gains and to maintain existing facilities. As a likely result of the pressure from the dumped imports, the Union industry had to postpone planned investments.

(173) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The return on investments increased between 2021 and 2022, but then dropped significantly between 2023 and the investigation period. This negative development shows that, although investments continued to be made to maintain and improve efficiency and competitiveness, the returns on those investments fell substantially over the period considered due to impossibility for the Union industry to improve the profitability rate.

(174) The cooperating Union producer’s ability to raise capital increased between 2021 and 2022 by 147 % but dropped significantly between 2023 and the end of the investigation period with a total reduction of 198 %.

4.6. Conclusion on injury

(175) The investigation showed that Chinese exporting producers, despite the stable consumption, managed to increase their import volume which is reflected in an increase of market share from 36 % in 2021 to 46,3 % in the investigation period.

(176) Several injury indicators showed negative trends, such as production, capacity utilisation, stocks, sales volume and market share, as well as employment and profitability. The Union industry faced increased costs of production, while it was unable to cover such increased costs by increasing the Union sales price (which followed a decreasing trend since 2022). The market share of Chinese imports increased while import prices showed a decreasing trend and were consistently below Union sales prices. These developments were reflected in the decreasing profitability of the Union industry, as well as its overall low level of investments.

(177) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

5. CAUSATION

(178) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: the imports from third countries and the export performance of the Union industry.

5.1. Effects of the dumped imports

(179) The deterioration of the Union industry’s situation coincided with the rapid increase in volume of dumped imports from China, which penetrated the Union market in substantial volumes, significantly undercutting the Union industry’s prices and, in any event, exercising significant price suppression on Union sales. As shown in Table 3, the volume of dumped imports from China increased from 62 273 tonnes in 2021 to 76 681 tonnes in the investigation period. As shown in Table 6, the sales of the Union industry decreased from 38 907 tonnes in 2021 to 23 148 tonnes in the investigation period. Considering that the Union consumption remained stable during that same period, this decrease of Union sales volume was reflected in a significant decrease of the market share of the Union industry, from 31 % in 2021 to 18 % in the investigation period. At the same time, the market share of Chinese imports increased, from 49 % to 59 %. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the growth of the Chinese imports on the Union market happened at the expense of Union industry sales.

(180) The price of the Chinese imports decreased over the period considered by 4 %. Import prices were throughout the entire period considered below the Union industry’s prices in the Union market and were substantially undercutting the Union industry prices. This price pressure prevented the Union industry from increasing its prices in line with the increase in cost. This resulted in a drop in profitability, which became negative in the investigation period.

(181) In light of the above, the Commission provisionally established that there is a causal link between the material injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation. Such injury had both volume and price effects.

5.2. Effects of other factors

5.2.1. Imports from third countries

(182) The imports from third countries were established following the methodology described in recital (134).

(183) The import volume from third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Imports from third countries

Country

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Türkiye

Quantity (tonnes)

5 610

7 804

9 130

10 865

Index

100

139

163

194

Market share

4 %

6 %

7 %

8 %

Average price

1 752

1 836

1 912

1 704

Index

100

105

109

South Korea

Quantity (tonnes)

5 380

6 439

4 445

4 591

Index

100

120

Market share

4 %

5 %

3 %

4 %

Average price

1 950

2 140

2 402

2 339

Index

100

110

123

120

India

Quantity (tonnes)

2 214

4 824

5 726

4 694

Index

100

218

259

212

Market share

2 %

4 %

Average price

1 598

1 863

1 861

1 881

Index

100

117

116

118

Japan

Quantity (tonnes)

3 191

3 501

4 083

3 277

Index

100

110

128

103

Market share

3 %

Average price

4 938

4 342

4 721

4 147

Index

100

United Kingdom

Quantity (tonnes)

1 084

1 136

1 276

1 549

Index

100

105

118

143

Market share

1 %

Average price

3 039

3 542

4 168

3 722

Index

100

117

137

122

Other third countries

Quantity

(tonnes)

7 218

5 601

5 618

5 203

Index

100

Market share

6 %

4 %

Average price

2 674

2 933

3 070

3 231

Index

100

110

115

121

Total of all third countries except the country concerned

Quantity (tonnes)

24 697

29 305

30 278

30 178

Index

100

119

123

122

Market share

20 %

23 %

24 %

23 %

Average price

2 519

2 483

2 663

2 460

Index

100

106

Source:

Complaint methodology.

(184) As shown in Table 12 above, the volume of imports of STS from third countries other than China remained at relatively low levels over the entire period considered. In terms of market share, no third country exceeded 8 % market share, while collectively all third countries remained consistently at levels below 25 %, which is less than half of the market share of Chinese imports at any point in time during the period considered. Moreover, the average price of imports from the five biggest importing countries after China were both individually and in aggregate, above or significantly above the Union sales prices and costs over the entire period considered.

(185) The Commission therefore provisionally concluded that the imports from other third countries have not contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.2. Export performance of the Union industry

(186) The Union industry is to a significant degree export-oriented. According to the cooperating Union producer, it faces increasingly intense competition from Chinese producers also in its export markets.

(187) The volume and average price of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as shown in Table 13. For reasons of confidentiality, the figures are provided in ranges:

Table 13

Export performance of the Union industry

2021

2022

2023

Investigation period

Export volume (tonnes)

[42 477 -71 793 ]

[33 770 -57 077 ]

[26 041 -44 014 ]

[26 485 -44 764 ]

Index

100

Average price (EUR)

[851 -1 439 ]

[1 218 -2 059 ]

[1 042 -1 763 ]

[1 019 -1 723 ]

Index

100

143

122

120

Source:

Macro questionnaire, cooperating producer’s questionnaire.

(188) As shown in Table 13, the volume of exports decreased over the period considered by almost 40 %, which is in line with the decrease of Union sales on the Union market. Moreover, the development of the average export price by the Union industry was also in line with the development of the Union industry’s sales price in the Union, increasing by about 20 % during the period considered, which was insufficient to cover the increase in costs over that period.

(189) However, the Commission considered that, as the economies of scale in the STS business are very low, the reduced export sales did not result in a significant increase of fixed costs and the impact on the Union industry’s profitability was therefore very limited. On this basis, the Commission provisionally concluded that the export performance of the Union industry did not break the causal link between the material injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped Chinese imports.

5.3. Conclusion on causation

(190) As already explained in recital (180), the rapid increase in the Chinese imports at low prices forced the Union industry to set their sales prices in the Union below its cost of production in order to stay competitive with Chinese prices and maintain its presence on the market.

(191) In light of the above considerations, a causal link was established between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China, which was not broken by the factors mentioned above.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

(192) In the present case, the complainants claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin would be higher than their injury margin (see recitals (200) to (202) below).

6.1. Injury margin

(193) The injury would be removed if the Union Industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(194) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(195) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition on the basis of the profitability achieved before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, i.e. in the years 2017 to 2020. Such profit margin was established at 8,5 %.

(196) On this basis, the non-injurious price is [1 500–2 000] EUR/tonne, resulting from applying the above-mentioned profit margin of 8,5 % to the cost of production during the IP of the cooperating Union producer.

(197) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). There were no such future costs reported by the Union industry.

(198) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of [1 500–2 000] EUR/tonne for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin (see recital 37) to the cost of production of the cooperating Union producer during the investigation period.

(199) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average price of imports from the country concerned, as established for the price undercutting calculations explained in recitals (138) to (143), with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the cooperating Union producer on the Union market during the investigation period. The difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

Country	Company	Dumping margin (%)	Injury margin (%)
China	All imports originating in country concerned	62,5 %	63,8 %

6.2. Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

(200) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in the country concerned regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(201) However, as the margins adequate to remove injury are higher than the dumping margins, the Commission considered that, at this stage, it was not necessary to address this aspect.

(202) Following the above assessment the Commission concluded that it is appropriate to determine the amount of provisional duties in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

6.3. Conclusion on the level of measures

(203) Following the above assessment, provisional anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country	Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty
The People’s Republic of China	All imports originating in country concerned	62,5 %

7. UNION INTEREST

(204) Having decided to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, traders and users.

7.1. Interest of the Union industry

(205) The imposition of measures would increase the import price of Chinese imports into the Union, resulting in an increased sales price on the Union market and thus allowing the Union industry to raise its prices in line with the increase in its cost of production. This will result in more sustainable pro fit levels allowing the Union industry to increase its investment in new technologies to improve competitiveness and to maintain its market presence.

(206) On the other hand, not imposing measures is likely to have a significant negative effect on the Union industry caused by further price suppression. A further decrease of prices would mean that the Union industry will continue to incur losses in the short term. Even the current price levels are already unsustainable for the Union industry. Any price increase by the Union industry, in an attempt to improve its profitability, would lead to further loss of the Union industry’s market share and ultimately to a decrease of production volume. Furthermore, with declining profitability and incurring losses, the Union industry would be unable to increase investments which are necessary to maintain its competitiveness on the Union market. As a consequence, the Union industry will be subject to a further financial deterioration in terms of profitability and investments, jeopardising its future.

(207) Should measures not be imposed, it could be expected that the increase of dumped imports from China would continue and even increase significantly in light of the possible overcapacities alleged in the complaint. In that situation, the Union industry would be unable to recover from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.

(208) The Commission therefore provisionally concluded that the imposition of measures would be in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2. Interest of importers and traders

(209) At initiation, 22 importers, traders and users were contacted and invited to cooperate in the investigation. Only one importer, USCO S.p.A. (‘USCO’), came forward and provided only a partial questionnaire reply. Consequently, no importer fully cooperated during the investigation.

(210) The above-mentioned importer submitted that as an effect of the measures, the price level of STS in the Union will likely increase, and STS will be increasingly sourced from Union producers rather than from Chinese producers. In the absence of measures, the importer claimed that STS will be increasingly sourced from Chinese producers, while importers will benefit from higher margins. This importer did not provide any supporting evidence for these statements, which were therefore rejected.

(211) STS are sourced by importers for sales in the aftersales market or for further assembly. In the absence of cooperation from importers, the Commission was not able to determine the precise impact of anti-dumping duties on their businesses.

(212) While the anti-dumping measures are likely to have an impact on the import prices, the Commission considered that importers and traders will likely be able to at least partly absorb the increased cost or pass on some of the cost increase to their customers. There are also alternative sources of supply of STS from other third countries. Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that importers and traders will not be disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures.

7.3. Interest of users

(213) The product under investigation is sourced by users for the assembly onto track chains used in a wide variety of tracked machines. STS must be replaced on a regular basis, and the product is therefore also sourced for the aftermarket.

(214) As an effect of the measures, USCO claimed that users can expect a price increase should measures be imposed and that undercarriage manufacturers in the Union operating in the global market will be negatively impacted in their export activities. The importer argued that in the absence of measures STS will be increasingly sourced from the PRC and users will benefit from lower prices. However, as mentioned above in recital (201), this importer did not submit any evidence in support of these statements and none of the users cooperated in the present investigation. Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(215) Based on the number and average weight of STS used in machinery such as excavators, bulldozers and cranes (78), STS do not constitute a major part of these downstream products. Moreover, based on the expected rising demand for the downstream products (79), users of STS should be able to pass on a significant part of any cost increase to their customers. On this basis, it can be reasonably concluded that the price increase of STS will not have a significant impact on the users’ profitability. In addition, as described above in recital (206), the absence of measures will lead to an immediate further deterioration of the situation of the Union industry, and in the medium to long term will likely drive Union producers out of the market. This will leave users with a reduced source of supply of STS and increase the dependence on China.

(216) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that measures would not disproportionally affect users.

7.4. Supply on the Union market

(217) USCO stated that it is not easy to determine the impact of measures on the availability of the product. However, it claimed that it would be possible for the Union industry to invest in capacity expansions (and therefore be in a position to increase supply), depending on the financial situation of the producers and their market perspective.

(218) Moreover, the investigation showed that the current capacity of the Union producers will be sufficient to serve the Union consumption with a current spare capacity of 55 %, as described in recital (148). The measures would allow Union producers to implement additional investments to increase efficiency, which could serve any additional demand. The investigation showed further that third countries other than China represented about 23 % of market share in the Union, as described in recital (183), representing additional sources of supply at non-dumped prices.

(219) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures would not risk the supply and availability of STS in the Union market.

7.5. Conclusion on Union interest

(220) The imposition of anti-dumping measures would relieve the Union industry from the price pressure in the Union market caused by the dumped Chinese imports and enable the Union industry to increase its prices in line with cost increases. Such price increase would have a positive impact on the Union industry’s profitability and investment levels, which would allow them to defend their market position and invest in new technologies to improve efficiency and competitiveness. On the other hand, not imposing the measures would lead to a rapid further deterioration of the Union industry’s profitability and sales volume and is likely to ultimately lead to the closure of production facilities in the Union.

(221) The investigation did not reveal that measures would have any disproportionate negative effects on importers, traders and users in the Union.

(222) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of STS originating in the PRC at this stage of the investigation.

8. PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(223) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(224) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of STS originating in China, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins, as set out in recitals (199) to (203) above. The amount of the duty was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margin.

(225) On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rate, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country	Company	Provisional anti-dumping duty
The People’s Republic of China	All imports originating in country concerned	62,5 %

(226) The anti-dumping duty rate specified in this Regulation was established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, it reflects the situation found during this investigation. This duty rate is exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned.

(227) As explained in recitals (32) and (33) above, STS sold as part of assembled products such as ‘track groups’ and ‘full track groups’ fall within the product scope. Therefore, when such assembled products incorporating STS are imported into the Union from the country concerned, the duties imposed should reflect only the value of the STS. In this regard, the Commission deemed it necessary to establish an average percentage of the value corresponding to the STS incorporated into the imported assembled product. The Commission provisionally established that, based on information provided by the complainant (80), the value of the STS represents on average 55 % of the value of a ‘track group’ and 50 % of the value of a ‘full track group’.

9. REGISTRATION

(228) As mentioned in recital (3), the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(229) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should be discontinued.

(230) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

10. INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE

(231) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(232) No comments on the accuracy of the calculations, within the meaning of Article 19a of the basic Regulation, were received. Comments received following pre-disclosure on matters other than the accuracy of the calculation will be addressed in the act concluding the investigation.

11. FINAL PROVISIONS

(233) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(234) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A provisional anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain types of steel shoes, with or without rubber pads attached thereto, whether or not assembled in a track chain, with a maximum length of 3 000 mm, used on machines currently falling under headings 8426 , 8429 or 8430 , or conveyor belts currently falling under heading 8428 originating in the People’s Republic of China.

The product concerned by the provisional anti-dumping duty is currently classified under CN codes ex 8431 39 00 , ex 8431 49 20 and ex 8431 49 80 (TARIC codes 8431 39 00 21, 8431 39 00 25, 8431 39 00 26, 8431 39 00 29, 8431 49 20 11, 8431 49 20 15, 8431 49 20 16, 8431 49 20 19, 8431 49 80 11, 8431 49 80 15, 8431 49 80 16 and 8431 49 80 19).

2. The rates of the provisional anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 62,5 %.

3. For the steel track shoes imported assembled in a track chain, the anti-dumping duty referred to in paragraph 2 shall be applied to the following share of the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the imported assembled products:

— 55 % for track groups;

— 50 % for full track groups.

4. The release for free circulation in the Union of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security deposit equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty.

5. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

1. Interested parties shall submit their written comments on this regulation to the Commission within 15 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

2. Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Commission shall do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

3. Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings are invited to do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. The Hearing Officer may examine requests submitted outside this time limit and may decide whether to accept to such requests if appropriate.

Article 3

1. Customs authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2721 of 24 October 2024.

2. Data collected regarding products which entered the EU for consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of the entry into force of this regulation shall be kept until the entry into force of possible definitive measures, or the termination of this proceeding.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the

Official Journal of the European Union

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 16 April 2025.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1)

OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21

, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of steel track shoes originating in the People’s Republic of China, OJ C series, C/2024/5264, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5264/oj

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2721 of 24 October 2024 making imports of steel track shoes originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (

OJ L, 2024/2721, 25.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2721/oj

(4)

https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2745

(5) t24.010083.

(6) t24.010082.

(7) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666 of 6 June 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in these countries or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1666/oj

; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444 of 11 July 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of steel bulb flats originating in the People’s Republic of China and Türkiye; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100 of 11 January 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel refillable kegs originating in the People’s Republic of China,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/1444/oj

; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/2068/oj

; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/191/oj

(8) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recital 76; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 66; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 58; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 80; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recital 208.

(9) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recital 60; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 45; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 38; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 64; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recital 192.

(10) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recitals 66-68; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 58; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 40; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 66; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recitals 193-194. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state-owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

(11) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recitals 61-65; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 59; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 43; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 68; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recitals 195-201.

(12) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 62; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 52; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 74; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recital 202.

(13) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recital 72; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 45; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 33; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 75; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recital 203.

(14) See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1666, recital 73; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1444, recital 64; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/100, recital 54; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2068, recital 76; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191, recital 204.

(15) Commission staff working document SWD (2024) 91, 10 April 2024, available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en

(16) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 of 1 April 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt, recitals 139-141.

(17) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 of 1 April 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt, recital 143.

(18) See:

http://www.juningjixie.com/en/index.html

(accessed on 10 February 2025).

(19) See:

http://www.liaoan.com.cn/gy/2672.html

(accessed on 10 February 2025).

(20) See: XCMG 2022 Annual Report, p. 89; available at:

http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2023/2023-4/2023-04-29/9182574.PDF

(accessed on 7 February 2025).

(21) See:

http://wap.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html